From wiki at gaydar.zp.ua Sun Jun 8 07:31:20 2008 From: wiki at gaydar.zp.ua (Victor) Date: Sun, 8 Jun 2008 14:31:20 +0300 Subject: [sudo-workers] disable -s Message-ID: <20080608113120.GA10522@radiocom.net.ua> Hi All! Sorry, I see that question on subj was some time ago. But. Now I have situation that my users is the used commands as "sudo -s -u root", and on this not save logging information about enterred command. Maybe we can add new option on source core for disable it? From Todd.Miller at courtesan.com Sun Jun 8 14:08:51 2008 From: Todd.Miller at courtesan.com (Todd C. Miller) Date: Sun, 08 Jun 2008 14:08:51 -0400 Subject: [sudo-workers] disable -s In-Reply-To: Your message of "Sun, 08 Jun 2008 14:31:20 +0300." <20080608113120.GA10522@radiocom.net.ua> References: <20080608113120.GA10522@radiocom.net.ua> Message-ID: <200806081808.m58I8pd3013561@core.courtesan.com> In message <20080608113120.GA10522 at radiocom.net.ua> so spake Victor (wiki): > Sorry, I see that question on subj was some time ago. > But. Now I have situation that my users is the used commands as "sudo - > s -u root", and on > this not save logging information about enterred command. > > Maybe we can add new option on source core for disable it? There's nothing magic about "sudo -s", it will only allow the user to run a shell if the sudoers file allows it. It is simply shorthand for "sudo $SHELL". If you don't want your users to be able to run a shell, their sudoers entries just have to reflect that. - todd From wiki at gaydar.zp.ua Mon Jun 9 10:36:25 2008 From: wiki at gaydar.zp.ua (Victor) Date: Mon, 9 Jun 2008 17:36:25 +0300 Subject: [sudo-workers] disable -s In-Reply-To: <200806081808.m58I8pd3013561@core.courtesan.com> References: <20080608113120.GA10522@radiocom.net.ua> <200806081808.m58I8pd3013561@core.courtesan.com> Message-ID: <20080609143625.GA41199@radiocom.net.ua> Hi, Todd! Sun, Jun 08, 2008 at 02:08:51PM -0400, Todd C. Miller wrote: > In message <20080608113120.GA10522 at radiocom.net.ua> > so spake Victor (wiki): > > > Sorry, I see that question on subj was some time ago. > > But. Now I have situation that my users is the used commands as "sudo - > > s -u root", and on > > this not save logging information about enterred command. > > > > Maybe we can add new option on source core for disable it? > > There's nothing magic about "sudo -s", it will only allow the user > to run a shell if the sudoers file allows it. It is simply shorthand > for "sudo $SHELL". If you don't want your users to be able to run > a shell, their sudoers entries just have to reflect that. Sorry, maybe we can show to me hint? > > - todd -- UV-RIPE From Todd.Miller at courtesan.com Tue Jun 10 21:31:19 2008 From: Todd.Miller at courtesan.com (Todd C. Miller) Date: Tue, 10 Jun 2008 21:31:19 -0400 Subject: [sudo-workers] sudo 1.7.0rc2 released Message-ID: <200806110131.m5B1VJ61013886@core.courtesan.com> This is the second release candidate of sudo version 1.7.0. I'd love to hear reports of success (or failure!) in real-world environments. Download links: http://www.sudo.ws/sudo/dist/beta/sudo-1.7.0rc2.tar.gz ftp://ftp.sudo.ws/pub/sudo/beta/sudo-1.7.0rc2.tar.gz Changes from Sudo 1.7.0rc1: * Added instructions for using sudo's LDAP support with Active Directory. * Now ignore SIGPIPE instead of blocking it when sending mail. What's new in Sudo 1.7? * Rewritten parser that converts sudoers into a set of data structures. This eliminates a number of ordering issues and makes it possible to apply sudoers Defaults entries before searching for the command. It also adds support for per-command Defaults specifications. * Sudoers now supports a #include facility to allow the inclusion of other sudoers-format files. * Sudo's -l (list) flag has been enhanced: o applicable Defaults options are now listed o a command argument can be specified for testing whether a user may run a specific command. o a new -U flag can be used in conjunction with "sudo -l" to allow root (or a user with "sudo ALL") list another user's privileges. * A new -g flag has been added to allow the user to specify a primary group to run the command as. The sudoers syntax has been extended to include a group section in the Runas specification. * A uid may now be used anywhere a username is valid. * The "secure_path" run-time Defaults option has been restored. * Password and group data is now cached for fast lookups. * The file descriptor at which sudo starts closing all open files is now configurable via sudoers and, optionally, the command line. * Visudo will now warn about aliases that are defined but not used. * The -i and -s command line flags now take an optional command to be run via the shell. Previously, the argument was passed to the shell as a script to run. * Improved LDAP support. SASL authentication may now be used in conjunction when connecting to an LDAP server. The krb5_ccname parameter in ldap.conf may be used to enable Kerberos. * Support for /etc/nsswitch.conf. LDAP users may now use nsswitch.conf to specify the sudoers order. E.g.: sudoers: ldap files to check LDAP, then /etc/sudoers. The default is "files", even when LDAP support is compiled in. This differs from sudo 1.6 where LDAP was always consulted first. * Support for /etc/environment on AIX and Linux. If sudo is run with the -i flag, the contents of /etc/environment are used to populate the new environment that is passed to the command being run. * If no terminal is available or if the new -A flag is specified, sudo will use a helper program to read the password if one is configured. Typically, this is a graphical password prompter such as ssh-askpass. * A new Defaults option, "mailfrom" that sets the value of the "From:" field in the warning/error mail. If unspecified, the login name of the invoking user is used. * A new flag, -n, may be used to indicate that sudo should not prompt the user for a password and, instead, exit with an error if authentication is required. From haralevi at inf.fu-berlin.de Thu Jun 26 18:48:04 2008 From: haralevi at inf.fu-berlin.de (Andre Haralevi) Date: Fri, 27 Jun 2008 00:48:04 +0200 Subject: [sudo-workers] Security Assurance in FOSS: Request for contribution Message-ID: <200806262248.m5QMmFO5002304@core.courtesan.com> Dear members of the Sudo project, we kindly ask for your participation in our survey on security assurance in free/open source software. Security assurances are confidence building activities through structured design processes, documentation, and testing. By participating in our survey you contribute to ongoing research with the aim to make free/open source software more secure. It will not take more than 10 minutes of your valuable time for our 21 questions. Our survey is online for the next two weeks until July 1 at: http://survey.mi.fu-berlin.de/public/survey.php?name=fosssecurity The survey is anonymous. Please find the results of the survey on the project page during July: https://www.inf.fu-berlin.de/w/SE/FOSSSecuritySurvey For further information about Open Source research at the Research Group Software Engineering at Freie Universitaet Berlin, please visit: https://www.inf.fu-berlin.de/w/SE/FOSSHome Thank you in anticipation, Sascha Rasmussen, Alexander Kunze, and Andre Haralevi In case you participate in more than one FOSS project, please fill out the questionnaire for the one where security is most important, or fill out one questionnaire per project. Thank you!